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Abstract
Background: Muslim majority countries have experienced a considerable burden of COVID-19 infection. However, there
has been a relative lack of research comparing COVID-19 outbreaks and responses between Muslim-majority countries.
Aims: This study aimed to analyse COVID-19 burden, epidemiology and mitigation strategies in Muslim-majority countries.
Methods: We use a mixed-methods approach to describe the course of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the Islamic
world, highlight the range of non-pharmaceutical interventions used and the speed with which they were implemented,
and investigate reasons behind the differing responses between Muslim-majority countries. The number of cases and
deaths per million population, and the mean time taken to implement a range of policies, were compared across the Islamic world. Cases per million population and the mean estimated doubling time for cases was compared between Muslim-majority countries on the basis of governance systems, rapidity of institution of mitigation strategies and conflict
groups. We also evaluated pushback to implementation of measures within MMCs, especially from religious quarters.
Results: Non-democratic regimes had much shorter doubling time of cases compared to functional democratic Muslim-majority countries (mean 33.9 versus 66.5 days, P = 0.002) and a significantly greater proportion of countries appeared
to have flattened the curve by 1 June 2020 (43.8% versus 12.5%, P < 0.03). The doubling time was also significantly greater
among countries who implemented lockdown and mitigation measures early (66.7 versus 16.7 days, P < 0.003).
Conclusion: Our analysis indicates wide diversity in the COVID-19 response across Muslim majority countries with
clear indication that functional democracies were able to contain the epidemic significantly better than nondemocratic
regimes. Future analysis should focus on determination of sub-national differentials and risks as well as targeting of
interventions.
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Introduction
COVID-19, a novel respiratory disease first identified
in late December 2019, was declared a global pandemic
by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March,
2020. Since first emerging from Wuhan, China, COVID-19 has resulted in almost 30 million recognised infections across 185 countries, and 941 000 deaths at the time
of writing (1–3).
Given the absence of a vaccine or viable treatment
for COVID-19, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
have been the main instruments for mitigating risks of
infection in tackling this ongoing epidemic (4). These
interventions have ranged in complexity and severity
from use of face masks, hand hygiene and physical
distancing to curfews, international travel restrictions,
military-led nationwide lockdowns and border closures.
Previous outbreaks, such as that of Ebola in 2014 and
H1N1 in 2009, have also shown that the timely use of
NPIs and implementation of such measures can have
an impact in reducing the spread of infectious diseases

(5,6). However, many of these measures such as social
distancing and school closures, as well as closure of
places of worship, have only rarely been implemented
and require a combination of community buy-in and
governmental oversight. Given the reported success of
many Asian countries in rapid control of COVID-19, such
as in China, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam and Singapore,
there is the notion that some government characteristics
and socio-political systems may have been more effective
in implementing NPIs and controlling the pandemic
than others (7).
Muslim majority populations do not represent a
homogenous block but do have geographic clustering
mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean, North African and
Southeast Asian regions. We have previously evaluated
the state of reproductive, maternal and child health and
implementation within health systems in many Muslimmajority countries or regions and documented the
important role of governance as well as societal factors
such as female education and empowerment (8,9). The
relative role of governments versus religious schools of
1173
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thought and political parties are also important drivers of
population uptake of interventions, such as reproductive
health and family planning, and have at times influenced
vaccine acceptability, evidenced by the struggle to
eradicate polio in some countries. There are also
communal religious activities such as mass gatherings
on Fridays and during the course of Ramadan and the
annual Hajj – all potential barriers in implementation
of NPIs in some contexts. Conversely, the Muslim use of
facial coverings by females in public could be protective.
Muslim-majority countries have experienced a
considerable burden of COVID-19, with the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Turkey among the first countries
outside of China to see a large-scale outbreak, followed
by Pakistan. However, there is relatively little research
comparing COVID-19 outbreaks and responses between
Muslim-majority countries, especially in the relationship
between community engagement, participation in NPIs
and the role of governments and governance mechanisms
(10). In addition to understanding the progression of
COVID-19 outbreaks in these countries, an understanding
of how each had tackled their outbreak could offer
potentially useful insights for future mitigation
strategies, including vaccination programmes.
In this article we describe the course of the COVID-19
pandemic across Muslim-majority countries, highlight
the range of NPIs used after the pandemic was called, and
the speed with which they were implemented. We also
investigate how variations in governance mechanisms
and style influenced the response to COVID-19 and
potential implications for future strategies.

Methods
Case and mortality data were extracted from the COVID-19 Dashboard created by the Center for Systems
Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University,
United States of America, with maps generated to show
the geographical heterogeneity across Muslim-majority
countries. Case data per million population were plotted
by time since 3 cases per million were reported in each
country, to allow for comparisons between Muslim-majority countries, with respect to the speed with which the
epidemic unfolded (3).
To assess the progression of NPI implementation
between March and May 2020, we created sequential
maps utilizing the Coronavirus Government response
tracker (OxCGRT) stringency index. This data set,
created by a collaborative group of researchers and staff
at Oxford University, United Kingdom, provides values
to assess the differing stringency of NPIs in countries,
specifically the strictness of ‘lockdown style’ policies
that primarily restrict people’s behaviour (11). Maps
were created to display the stringency index of Muslimmajority countries for the first of each month from
March to August 2020.
We also utilized the ACAPS government measures
dataset compiled by analysts and volunteers from the
University of Copenhagen and the University of Lund,
1174
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Denmark (12), to assess the early phase of the COVID-19
response, determined a-prior to be the end of Ramadan
and Eid festivities (end May 2020). These data were
compiled through internet searching of news reports,
government sites and other organizations such as
the United Nations (UN). Full details on the dataset
structure and collection methods can be found through
the ACAPS website (13). The full ACAPS data set was
downloaded on 3 June 2020. From this, we determined
the date of first policy implementation and date of phase
out (where applicable) of measure categories in each
country. In total, there were 32 different policy measures
documented, which fall into five broad categories. These
categories range from movement restrictions (such
as visa restrictions, domestic travel restrictions and
curfew) to public health measures (such as awareness
campaigns and mask-wearing policy) to lockdowns
(which includes full countrywide lockdown or lockdown
of refugee/internally displaced persons camps). To better
understand the difference in NPI implementation across
Muslim-majority countries, the time between the WHO’s
announcement of COVID-19 as a global pandemic and
the implementation of various NPIs was calculated, with
the mean number of days (and 95% confidence interval)
plotted for each NPI.
We assessed the nature and effectiveness of
governance and civic society engagement in each country
on the basis of its rankings on the democracy index, based
on the 2019 Democracy Index Report of The Economist
Intelligence Unit (14). This report scores countries based
on electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of
government, political participation, political culture,
and civil liberties. We created tertiles of these scores to
divide Muslim-majority countries into three democracy
groupings: 1 (least democratic), 2 (middle tertile), and 3
(most democratic). These classifications were used to
compare the political response to COVID-19 between
different democracy and governance categories. Cases
per million population (for both periods) and the mean
estimated doubling time for cases was compared between
the democracy index tertiles.
Data from the Google Mobility Reports for each
Muslim-majority country were assessed to determine
whether the month of Ramadan (23 April 2020 – 23 May
2020) or the Eid ul Fitr celebrations that followed, could
be identified as having had an impact on the amount
of time people in these countries spent at home, in
congregational settings such as parks, and retail and
workplace environments. Mean mobility scores for this
month were compared to those for 11 March 2020 – 22
April 2020, and 24 May 2020 – 3 June 2020. The date of
11 March was chosen as the earliest for mobility scores,
since most countries had stabilised around their lowest
values by this date (15).
To relate the implementation and uptake of NPI
measures, given the known variation in the onset and
overall progression of COVID-19 infections, we grouped
Muslim-majority countries on the basis of the timing
and overall size of COVID-19 outbreak over this period.
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In total, four outbreak timing/size categories were
generated: early start and small outbreak; early start and
large outbreak; late start and small outbreak; and late
start and large outbreak. An early outbreak was defined as
having at least 10 reported cases by the time of the WHO’s
pandemic announcement of 11 March, while a small
outbreak was defined as having fewer than 100 confirmed
cases per million as of 1 June. Additional classifications
to compare the COVID-19 response between Muslimmajority countries included geography (based on World
Bank regions) and population size (based on United
Nations Population Division population estimates for
2019) (16,17).
To find reports on the extent of pushback or resistance
related to the closure or restriction of religious activities,
Google was utilized to find news reports for each country.
The search location was set to the country of interest
and searches were conducted pairing the country name
with the keywords “mosque”, “COVID-19”, “coronavirus”,
“prayer”, and “imam”. The first two pages of search
results were screened and relevant articles were opened
to look for indication of pushback. Pushback was then
categorized as being by religious leaders (e.g. religious
leaders or politicians from religious parties speaking out
against government policy or encouraging continuation
of prayer) or by the general public in response to
restrictions on religious gathering (e.g. protests).
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Results
As of 1 August 2020, there was a total of 2 435 647 recorded cases of COVID-19 and 60 397 COVID-related deaths
across 44 Muslim-majority countries. The greatest relative burden of both cases and deaths have been in Kyrgyzstan (5754 cases and 219 deaths per million population, respectively) and Islamic Republic of Iran (3747
cases and 210 deaths per million population, respectively)
(Figure 1, Figure 2). It is worth noting, however, that testing rates across Muslim-majority countries are generally
low (Appendix 1 online) with the exception of a number
of countries in the Gulf Region with relatively small indigenous populations.
We divided our analysis into an assessment of the
early stage of the COVID-19 response, arbitrarily defined
as the period up to the end of Ramadan and Eid ul Fitr
(end May 2020) and the subsequent phase of stabilization
leading up to the Hajj (end July 2020). We therefore
considered the period up to 1 June to be the first complete
phase of response to the pandemic and treated this
time as the primary period of interest, given that most
stringent measures were seen to relax thereafter. We
also compared this primary response period to the period
from 2 June to 1 August and to the entire pandemic period
included in the John Hopkin’s database up to the time of
writing (22 January to 1 August 2020) (Figure 3).

Figure 1 COVID-19 cases per million population (as of 1 August 2020)

1175
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Figure 2 COVID-19 deaths per million population (as of 1 August 2020)

There was considerable variation in the
commencement and rate of outbreak development.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey experienced
outbreaks that started early and escalated rapidly. In
contrast, Bangladesh’s outbreak began later but case

trajectories have since mirrored those in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Turkey. Albania, Tunisia, and
Lebanon experienced gradual outbreaks with slow rates
of increase when compared to other Muslim-majority
countries. Many Muslim-majority countries in Sub-

Figure 3 Stringency index scores for Muslim-majority countries as of A) 1 March 2020, B) 1 April 2020, C) 1 May 2020, D) 1 June
2020, E) 1 July 2020, F) 1 August 2020.
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Saharan Africa appeared to be at earlier stages of their
COVID-19 outbreaks relative to other Muslim-majority
countries. Additionally, there was little evidence of
widespread “second waves” of infection among Muslimmajority countries, with the possible exception of
Kyrgyzstan and Iraq (Figure 4).
Our analysis showed some differences between
governance categories among Muslim-majority countries
and COVID-19 burden and trends. As of 1 June 2020, there
were notable differences in COVID-19 cases per million
population between governance groups, although they
were not statistically significant. The most democratic
countries had a mean of 199.7 cases per million (95% CI:
137.0, 262.5); the middle tertile countries had a mean of
2534.6 cases per million (95 % CI: 0.0, 5692.6); and the
least democratic countries had a mean of 1442.3 cases
per million (95% CI: 324.5, 2560.2). There was a significant
difference between governance groups with regards to
the percentage of countries that had flattened the curve
by 1 June. Only 7.1% of the least democratic countries had
flattened the curve (95% CI: 0.0, 21.6) whilst 30.8% (95% CI:
3.8, 57.7) and 38.5% (95% CI: 10.1, 66.9) of the middle tertile
and most democratic countries had flattened the curve,
respectively (Table 1). However, over the entire period for
which data were available (22 January to 1 August) there
were no statistically significant differences observed
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between countries for any of the measures calculated
(Table 2).
We evaluated if there was a direct link between
COVID-19 response and policies and governance in
each of the Muslim-majority countries. Policy data were
available for 44 Muslim-majority countries in the first
response phase of the outbreak.
Among countries with listed start dates for policy
measures, the most common control measure was
suspension of international flights (90.1%). This was
followed by limiting public gatherings (86.4%), domestic
travel restrictions (79.5%) and school closures (79.6%).
The mean time from the WHO pandemic declaration
to the implementation of each policy indicated that
a requirement for additional health documents was
implemented earliest across countries, while the
requirement to wear protective gear was implemented
latest across countries (Figure 5). The mean number of
days after the WHO’s declaration for partial lockdown to
be implemented across countries was over two weeks (18
days), while full lockdown occurred almost four weeks (26
days) after the declaration. The range of implementation
time varies widely for most policy measures. The reason
for this is likely to be a combination of situational
differences in case counts by country, countries learning
from one another’s approach, and public acceptability.

Figure 4: Epidemic curves for all Muslim-majority countries showing cumulative cases per
million population over time since 3 cases per million were first reported.

Figure 4 Epidemic curves for all Muslim-majority countries showing cumulative cases per million population over time since 3
cases per million were first reported.
(Blue lines = named country. Grey lines = all other Muslim-majority countries)
(Blue lines = named country. Grey lines = all other Muslim-majority countries)
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Table 1 Cases per million, mean estimated doubling time, and percentage of countries with flattened epidemic curves by
democracy group and early/late implementation of strict movement restrictions (as of 1 June 2020)
Cases per million

P-value

Mean estimated
doubling time (in days)
over past 7 days

P-value

Percentage of
countries that have
flattened the curve

P-value

1442.3 (324.5, 2560.2)

REF

23.2 (17.3, 29.1)

REF

7.1 (0.0, 21.6)

REF

Democracy Group (N=40)
1 (Least democratic) (N=14)
2 (N=13)

2534.6 (0.0, 5692.6)

0.414

101.8 (0.0, 204.7)

0.066

30.8 (3.8, 57.7)

0.160

3 (Most democratic) (N=13)

199.7 (137.0, 262.5)

0.353

48.5 (23.2, 73.9)

0.545

38.5 (10.1, 66.9)

0.065

Yes (N=9)

596.1 (16.9, 1175.3)

0.481

49.0 (20.8, 77.3)

0.977

66.7 (28.2, 100.0)

0.003

No (N=35)

1549.6 (70.5, 3028.7)

Implemented strict movement
restrictions early (N=44)
48.2 (17.0, 79.3)

16.7 (2.5, 30.8)

P-values calculated with t-tests. CI = Confidence Interval

We investigated whether there was an association
between the month of Ramadan and increased mobility
outside the home. We found less time was spent in places
of retail (mean difference, md: -3.18; 95% CI: –5.21, –1.15; P
= 0.002), in parks (md: –4.12; 95% CI: –6.03, –2.21; P < 0.001),
and on transit systems (md: –4.38; 95% CI: –6.46, -2.30; P
< 0.001) as compared to outside of Ramadan. Conversely,
time spent in residential properties saw a statistically
significant increase during the month of Ramadan (md:
2.39; 95% CI: 1.61, 3.17; P < 0.001) (Appendix 2 online).
To illustrate the range of governmental responses to
the COVID-19 pandemic in Muslim-majority countries,
we selected Bangladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, and
Turkey for more in-depth analysis (Appendix 3 online).
These particular countries were chosen as we considered
they represent the early, current, and possible future
hotspots of COVID-19 in Muslim-majority countries.
The first reported case of COVID-19 in the Islamic
Republic of Iran occurred on 19 February 2020. Early
NPIs were limited to policies relating to health screening
and preventing travel from China. Following the first
detected case, no additional policy action was taken until
27 February 2020, which then included closing all schools
and border checks within major cities. Improvements to
the public health system were made through donations
of test kits and supplies from the Red Cross and Chinese

government. Until the country had surpassed 1000 cases
on 2 March, no additional actions were taken. At this
time, flight suspensions to Europe were implemented
along with awareness campaigns and temperature
checks; inmates were temporarily released from prisons.
This was in the wake of April protests that had called for
additional prisoner protections and resulted in deaths of
some of those protesting. The implementation of a partial
lockdown, in which some parts of the government were
closed, did not occur until 30 March when the country
had already recorded over 41 000 cases and nearly 3000
deaths.
At the end of the first phase, Turkey had the greatest
number of COVID-19 cases among all Muslim-majority
countries, despite the first case not being reported until 11
March 2020. Similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran, early
policy measures focused on restrictions of travel from
COVID-19 hotspots (primarily Islamic Republic of Iran and
China). Within a week of the first reported case, policies
were swiftly expanded to include a number of measures
to promote social distancing. These included school
closures, curfews and the closure of places of social and
religious activity including mosques, bars, restaurants,
sporting venues, and theatres. Over the following weeks,
extensive policy implementation occurred. Along with
this swift government action, a number of reports have

Table 2 Cases per million, mean estimated doubling time, and percentage of countries with flattened epidemic curves by
democracy group and early/late implementation of strict movement restrictions (as of 1 August 2020)
Cases per million

P-value

Mean estimated
doubling time (in days)
over past 7 days

P-value

Percentage of
countries that have
flattened the curve

P-value

3837.1 (374.3, 7299.9)

REF

140.0 (65.8, 214.1)

REF

78.6 (55.6, 100.0)

REF

6482.0 (273.7, 12690.4)

0.360

139.9 (73.4, 206.4)

0.999

84.6 (63.5, 100.0)

0.717

1039.7 (216.9, 1862.5)

0.333

125.0 (45.9, 204.2)

0.772

69.2 (42.3, 96.2)

0.576

Yes (N=9)

1612.5 (472.0, 2752.9)

0.350

94.0 (0.0, 197.0)

0.582

66.7 (28.2, 100.0)

0.418

No (N=35)

4367.3 (1153.5, 7581.1)

Democracy Group (N=40)
1 (Least democratic) (N=14)
2 (N=13)
3 (Most democratic) (N=13)
Implemented strict movement
restrictions early (N=44)

P-values calculated with t-tests. CI = Confidence Interval
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117.3 (79.8, 154.7

80.0 (64.8, 95.2)
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Figure
5 Comparison
implementationof
ofglobal
non-pharmacological
mitigation
actions
and policies across Muslim-majority countries
(data are mean value of days and 95% CI time in relation to WHO declaration of global pandemic on 11 March 2020)

indicated that government crackdowns had occurred
to target claims of misinformation, resulting in the
detainment of social media users and journalists (18).
Among all countries for which a phase one response
snapshot was created, Bangladesh was one of only
three (in addition to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
that implemented no social distancing-related policies
before 1 June. Early policies instead focused on limiting
travel and post-travel quarantine. In the month of April,
multiple news agencies reported of thousands gathering
at funerals (19,20). Given the current trajectory of cases
in Bangladesh along with the considerably higher
population density and the possible risk of COVID-19
spreading within Rohingya refugee camps, the situation
in Bangladesh has the potential to evolve significantly.
When comparing pushback between countries, it
was found that many had closed mosques or restricted
communal prayers. There were 16 countries for which
we found pushback to distancing was reported by
leaders, the public or both (Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mali, Morocco,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Syrian
Arab Republic, Sudan and Turkmenistan). Of these 16
countries, 11 had outbreaks that were classified as small
and 9 had outbreaks classified as starting late. No other
trends were seen between categories for this group.

Examination of policy timing across the 16 countries
with pushback indicated that half had implemented
no COVID-19 related policies at the time of the WHO’s
pandemic declaration, while a quarter (Bangladesh, Iraq,
Mali, Turkmenistan) had implemented only one. Four
countries implemented four or more policies before the
WHO pandemic declaration (Indonesia, Islamic Republic
of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan).
Where pushback was reported, this consisted of
mosques remaining open and communal prayers
continuing despite the need for social distancing. In 3
countries (Morocco, Niger and Senegal) this pushback
escalated to protests and violence with the public and
in some cases religious leaders being arrested (21-23).
In Iraq, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia there has been a
mixed response from religious leaders. For example,
in Somalia some militant religious leaders have spread
misinformation (24). In response, mainstream Muslim
clerics have closed madrassas to reduce the spread and
are now using teachers from these schools as well as local
Imams to spread accurate health information (24).

Discussion
Recognizably, many factors driving the COVID-19 pandemic in countries such as rates of transmission, testing
susceptible populations, prevalence of co-morbidities
and health system functionality, are important in deter1179
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mining the caseload and mortality. Another important
driver of success or otherwise of national responses
relates to the decision-making process and population
responsiveness to NPIs in countries and the subject of
this study. We restricted our analysis to countries facing
common challenges related to communal religious practices such as Friday prayers and those in Ramadan and
subsequent festivities. Our choice of the three countries
for in-depth analysis was also justified by events therein and in neighbouring countries. Although the Islamic
Republic of Iran was one of the earliest countries affected by COVID-19 in the Islamic world, the epidemic took
longer to gain a foothold in other Muslim-majority countries, and in the case of Turkey it followed the outbreak
in Europe. Afghanistan and Pakistan had received some
of the earliest travelers from the Islamic Republic of Iran,
mostly returning pilgrims, but were able to institute early screening and quarantine measures followed by other
measures.
Elsewhere, religious aggregations and returning
pilgrims were also blamed for the pandemic spread (25).
In several countries, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Muslim populations in India, there was acrimonious
debate around widespread participation in religious
activities and communal gatherings (26). However, our
analysis of available data on population mobility from
Muslim-majority countries and case loads does not
suggest any link with mobility during the month of
Ramadan or specifically on Fridays, the day for communal
afternoon prayers.
There is also a general sense that countries with
non-democratic governments have been generally more
successful in keeping the COVID-19 outbreak under
control (27) compared to participatory democracies.
Based on the governance metrics that we used, we found
little evidence that strict governance was a major driver
of COVID-19 in any of the Muslim-majority countries.
In fact, it could be argued that the major outbreaks
in Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, and Turkey took
place despite such lockdown measures being imposed
with force and rapidity. Given the need for community
engagement and buy-in for many of the measures, such
as stoppage of businesses, transportation and services,
imposition of rules for physical isolation and use of
masks, it can be argued that Muslim-majority countries
with more democratic governments have done better in
terms of sustaining a public response with widespread
participation. This phenomenon is not just restricted
to the Muslim world. No-one has underscored this link
with pandemic responsiveness better than Francis
Fukuyama who wrote that, “The factors responsible for
successful pandemic responses have been state capacity,
social trust, and leadership. Countries with all three – a
competent state apparatus, a government that citizens
trust and listen to, and effective leaders – have performed
impressively, limiting the damage they have suffered”
(28). Our analysis strongly supports this premise.
1180
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Limitations
It is critically important that scientific enquiry and analysis is not hampered by confirmation bias (29). Notwithstanding this limitation, our data do indicate that early
imposition of non-pharmacological measures did impact
the growth of COVID-19 infections, and epidemic curves
have not indicated that strict imposition have led to superior outcomes. We recognize that these are early days
and the best data on consequences may only emerge over
time, but it is important to test the counterfactual scenarios through these natural experiments against analyses
claiming the huge success of large-scale lockdowns and
strict measures (27). At the time of writing, a few Muslim-majority countries were still witnessing a secondary
rise in cases whereas in others the curve seemed to have
flattened – all indicative of a clear lack of association
with severe mitigation strategies such as curfews and
lockdowns. However, Saudi Arabia was able to institute
remarkable control measures and restrictions over the
Hajj, with no reported outbreaks.
Several limitations should be recognized in
considering these data and countries. As Appendix
1 (online) indicates, testing rates remains low in the
vast majority of Muslim-majority countries, with the
exception of Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Our analysis
is presently limited to burden estimates as reported in the
aggregate and further work to evaluate and understand
sub-national differentials and inequities is underway.
We relied upon the governance assessment indicators
provided by the independent analysis of the intelligence
unit of The Economist and a widely used Democracy
index. These measures could be complemented further
by additional information on transparency as well as
strengths of the public health systems in each Muslimmajority country (14,30). Our analysis utilizes variables
from a variety of different data sources and should
therefore be interpreted with caution. While every effort
has been made to ensure the credibility of these sources,
the high level of complexity within each data source
should be considered. We also recognize that while some
differences in epidemiological patterns were evident
in the early stage of the pandemic, they seem to have
disappeared by the end of July. However, the pandemic
is far from over and we intend to track progress in these
countries in comparison to others prospectively.
We have not presented findings on estimated indirect
effects of pandemic and NPIs in these countries. Given
the enormous indirect consequences of these public
health measures and lockdowns on poverty, rising
inequities and interruption of education services (30),
further evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 in Muslimmajority countries must include estimation of effects
on longer term outcomes (31). These could relate to
the consequences of short and medium-term political
processes as well as long-term impact on economic and
human development.
Funding: None.
Competing interests: None declared.
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Analyse de la charge de morbidité de la COVID-19, épidémiologie et stratégies
d’atténuation dans les pays à majorité musulmane
Résumé
Contexte : Les pays à majorité musulmane ont connu une charge considérable d’infection par la COVID-19. On constate
cependant un manque relatif de recherches comparant les flambées de COVID-19 et les ripostes entre les pays à majorité
musulmane.
Objectifs : La présente étude visait à analyser la charge de morbidité de la COVID-19, l’épidémiologie de cette maladie
et les stratégies d’atténuation de sa propagation dans les pays à majorité musulmane.
Méthodes : Nous utilisons une approche fondée sur des méthodes mixtes pour présenter l'évolution de la pandémie
de COVID-19 dans le monde islamique, mettre en évidence l'éventail des interventions non pharmaceutiques utilisées
et la vitesse à laquelle elles ont été mises en œuvre, et enquêter sur les raisons expliquant les différentes réponses entre
les pays à majorité musulmane. Le nombre de cas et de décès par million d’habitants, ainsi que le délai médian
nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre un ensemble de politiques, ont été comparés dans l’ensemble du monde islamique.
Le nombre de cas par million d’habitants et la durée moyenne estimée du doublement des cas ont été comparés entre
les pays à majorité musulmane sur la base des systèmes de gouvernance, de la rapidité de mise en place de stratégies
d’atténuation et des groupes en conflit. Nous avons également évalué le refus de la mise en œuvre de mesures dans les
pays à majorité musulmane, en particulier dans les milieux religieux.
Résultats : Les régimes non démocratiques avaient une durée de doublement des cas bien plus courte que les pays
démocratiques à majorité musulmane fonctionnels (moyenne de 33,9 jours contre 66,5 jours, p = 0,002) et une
proportion significativement plus importante de pays semblait avoir connu un aplatissement de la courbe
au 1er juin 2020 (43,8 % contre 12,5 %, p < 0,03). Le temps de doublement était également nettement plus significatif
parmi les pays qui ont mis en œuvre des mesures de confinement et d'atténuation de manière précoce (66,7 jours
contre 16,7 jours, p < 0,003).
Conclusions : Notre analyse indique une grande diversité de la riposte face à la COVID-19 dans les pays à majorité
musulmane, avec une indication claire que les démocraties fonctionnelles ont été capables de contenir l’épidémie de
manière significativement meilleure que les régimes non démocratiques. L'analyse future devrait se concentrer sur la
détermination des différentiels et des risques infranationaux ainsi que sur le ciblage des interventions.

 واسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من أعبائه يف البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة، ووبائياته19-حتليل عبء كوفيد
 ذوالفقار بوتا، زينب صمد، جيمس رايت،راشيل جاردين

اخلالصة

 يوجد نقص نسبي يف البحوث التي تقارن بني، ومع ذلك.19-ريا من عدوى كوفيد
ً  لقد شهدت البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة عبئًا كب:اخللفية
. واالستجابة هلا بني هذه البلدان19-فاشيات كوفيد
. ووبائياته واسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من أعبائه يف البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة19- هدفت الدراسة إىل حتليل عبء كوفيد:األهداف

ً
التدخالت
 وتسليط الضوء عىل جمموعة، يف مجيع أنحاء العامل اإلسالمي19-خمتلطا لوصف مسار جائحة كوفيد
 استخدمنا أسلو ًبا:طرق البحث
ّ
. واستقصاء األسباب الكامنة وراء االستجابات املختلفة بني البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة،غري الصيدالنية املستخدمة والرسعة التي ُت َن َّفذ هبا
. ومتوسط الوقت املستغرق لتنفيذ جمموعة من السياسات يف مجيع أنحاء العامل اإلسالمي،وقورنت أعداد احلاالت والوفيات لكل مليون نسمة
،وقورنت أعداد احلاالت لكل مليون نسمة ومتوسط الوقت املقدَّ ر ملضاعفة عدد احلاالت بني البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة عىل أساس نظم احلوكمة
ً وقيمنا
،أيضا مقاومة تنفيذ التدابري داخل هذه املؤسسات
ّ . واملجموعات التي تعاين من النزاعات،ورسعة وضع اسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من العبء
.سيام من األوساط الدينية
ّ وال
 كان وقت مضاعفة احلاالت يف األنظمة غري الديمقراطية أقرص بكثري مقارنة بالبلدان الديمقراطية العاملة ذات األغلبية املسلمة (متوسط:النتائج
ّ ) ويبدو أن نسبة أكرب بكثري من البلدان أ ّدت إىل0.002 =  القيمة االحتاملية، يو ًما66.5  مقابل33.9
2020 يونيو/ حزيران1 تسطح املنحنى بحلول
ً  وكان وقت املضاعفة أكرب بكثري.)0.03 <  القيمة االحتاملية،%12.5  مقابل%43.8(
أيضا بني البلدان التي ن ّفذت تدابري اإلغالق والتخفيف يف
.)0.003 < P  القيمة االحتاملية، يوم16.7  مقابل66.7( وقت مبكر
 يف مجيع البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة مع إشارة واضحة إىل أن الديمقراطيات19-تنوع كبري يف استجابة كوفيد
ّ  يشري حتليلنا إىل وجود:االستنتاجات
ّ العاملة
ّ  وينبغي للتحليل أن.متكنت من احتواء الوباء أفضل بكثري من األنظمة غري الديمقراطية
يركز يف املستقبل عىل حتديد الفوارق واملخاطر عىل
.التدخالت
الصعيد دون الوطني وكذلك حتديد أهداف
ّ

1181

Research article

EMHJ – Vol. 26 No. 10 – 2020

References
1.

World Health Organization. WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2020. (https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020).

2.

Wuhan City Health Committee. Wuhan Municipal Health Commission on the current situation of pneumonia in our city. 2019.
(http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2019123108989).

3.

Dong E, Du H, Gardner L. An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time. Lancet Infect Dis. 2020. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30120-1.

4.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Public health preparedness capabilities: national standards for state and local
planning. Atlanta: CDC; 2020 (https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/readiness/00_docs/capability11.pdf).

5.

Cowling B, Leung G. Facemasks and Hand Hygiene to Prevent Influenza Transmission in Households. Ann Intern Med. 2009
Oct 6;151(7):437-46. doi:10.7326/0003-4819-151-7-200910060-00142. Epub 2009 Aug 3.

6.

Merler S, Ajelli M, Fumanelli L, Gomes M, Pastore y Piontti A, Rossi L, et al. Spatiotemporal spread of the 2014 outbreak of Ebola
virus disease in Liberia and the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions: a computational modelling analysis. Lancet
Infect Dis. 2015;15:204–11.

7.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Strengthening democracy through partnership. Mitigating the impact of
COVID-19 through democracy, human rights, and governance assistance. Arlington, VA: IFES; 2020 (https://www.ifes.org/publications/mitigating-impact-covid-19-through-democracy-human-rights-and-governance-assistance).

8.

Bhutta Z, Belgaumi A, Abdur Rab M, Karrar Z, Khashaba M, Mouane N. Child health and survival in the Eastern Mediterranean
Region. Br Med J. 2006;333:839–42.

9.

Askeer N, Kamali M, Bakhache N. Status and drivers of maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health in the Islamic world: a
comparative analysis. Lancet 2018;391:1493–512.

10.

Ghadyani M, Hussain H, Odeh W, Wood P. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria, Iran and Pakistan. Abdou Filali-Ansary Occas Pap Ser. 2020;0–34.

11.

Cameron-Blake E, Tatlow H, Hallas L, Majumdar S. University of Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker. 2020.
(https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker).

12.

ACAPS. #COVID19 Government Measures Dataset. Geneva: ACAPS; 2020. (https://www.acaps.org/covid19-government-measures-dataset).

13.

ACAPS. ACAPS COVID-19: Government Measures Dataset - Methodology. 2020. (https://www.acaps.org/projects/covid19/data).

14.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy index 2019. 2019 (http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019).

15.

Google. See how your community is moving around differently due to COVID-19 [online] (https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/).

16.

The World Bank. Where we work. Washington DC; The World Bank; 2020 (https://www.worldbank.org/en/where-we-work).

17.

United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs. World population prospects. New York, United Nations; 2019
(https://population.un.org/wpp/).

18.

Yackley AJ. Turkey builds more hospitals as coronavirus cases spike. AL-Monitor. 2020. (https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-build-hospitals-coronavirus.html).

19.

Wyatt T. Coronavirus: More than 100,000 defy lockdown and gather for funeral in Bangladesh. Independent, 20 April 2020.
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/coronavirus-lockdown-bangladesh-funeral-social-distancing-gathering-a9474596.html).

20.

Mahmud A. Tens of thousands gather for funeral in Bangladesh, sparking outbreak fears. 19 April 2020. (https://www.ctvnews.
ca/world/tens-of-thousands-gather-for-funeral-in-bangladesh-sparking-outbreak-fears-1.4902906).

21.

Sarr L. Riots in Niger over Coronavirus Ban on Congregational Prayer. La Croix Africa. 25 April 2020. (https://africa.la-croix.com/
riots-in-niger-over-coronavirus-ban-on-congregational-prayer/).

22.

Morocco army enforces state of emergency. Middle East Online. 23 March 2020. (https://middle-east-online.com/en/morocco-army-enforces-state-emergency).

23.

Gueye SA. The faith of the Senegalese to the test of the coronavirus. Voa afrique. 30 March 2020. (https://translate.google.
com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=https://www.voaafrique.com/a/la-foi-des-s%25C3%25A9n%25C3%25A9galais-%25C3%25A0-l%25C3%25A9preuve-du-covid-19/5351921.html&prev=search).

24.

Harper M. Coronavirus: fighting al-Shabab propaganda in Somalia. BBC News. 1 April 2020. (https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-52103799).

25.

Slater J, Masih N. As the world looks for coronavirius scapegoats, Muslims are blamed in India. Washington Post. 22 April 2020.
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-world-looks-for-coronavirus-scapegoats-india-pins-blame-on-muslims/2020/04/22/3cb43430-7f3f-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.html).

1182

Research article

EMHJ – Vol. 26 No. 10 – 2020

26.

Serhan Y. The Tensions underlying Pakistan’s Ramadan decision. The Atlantic. 7 May 2020. (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/05/ramadan-pakistan-lockdown-coronavirus-islam/611173/).

27.

Kavanagh M, Singh R. Democracy, Capacity and coercion in pandemic response- COVID 19 in comparative political perspective.
J Health Polit Policy Law 2020. 2020 May 28;8641530. doi:10.1215/03616878-8641530

28.

Fukuyama F. The pandemic and political order: it takes a state. Foreign Affairs July/August 2020. (https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-and-political-order).

29.

Nickerson R. Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev Gen Psychol. 1998;2:175–220.

30.

Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index. Berlin: Transparency International; 2019. (https://www.transparency.
org/en/cpi#).

31.

Roberton T, Carter E, Chou V, Stegmuller A, Jackson B, et al. Early estimates of the indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on
maternal and child mortality in low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study. Lancet Glob Health 2020. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30229-1.

1183

